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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
ANTITRUST LAW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEVENTH AMENDMENT-DUE PROCESS
OVERRIDES RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL IN COMPLEX CASES. In re Japanese
Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 11980-21 Trade Cas. (CCH)
63,421 (3d Cir.). Two American electronic products producers' sued
their Japanese competitors2 under antitrust and anti-dumping acts,3 al-
leging that the competitors attempted to drive the producers out of
business by selling products in America at artificially reduced prices.4
Fourteen of the defendants' moved to strike the plaintiff's demand for
1. One of the two plaintiffs, National Union Electric Corp., was no longer an electronic
products producer at the time of filing suit in December 1970, but it had been a major domestic
television receiver producer until February of that year. The other plaintiff, Zenith Radio Corp.,
was still a major producer of many kinds of electronic products when it filed suit in 1974. In re
Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation, [1980-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,421, at 76,186-87 (3d
Cir.) (also reported at 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980)).
The suits were later consolidated for trial. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,
478 F. Supp. 889 (E.D. Pa. 1979), reV'd sub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation,
[1980-21 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 63,421 (3d Cir.).
2. National Union Electronic Corp. named as defendants a Japanese trading company, Mit-
subishi Corp., and seven Japanese television manufacturers: Matsushita Electric Industrial Co.,
Toshiba Corp., Hitachi Ltd., Sharp Corp., Mitsubishi Electric Corp., Sanyo Electric Co., and Sony
Corp., as well as nine subsidiaries of those companies. Zenith named as defendants all of the
above companies plus several additional subsidiaries and two American companies: Sears, Roe-
buck and Co. and Motorola, Inc. [1980-21 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,421, at 76, 186-87 (3d Cir.).
3. National Union Electric alleged violations of the Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, 15 U.S.C.
§ 72 (1976), the Sherman Act §§ 1, 2, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976), and the Wilson Tariff Act § 73, 15
U.S.C. § 8 (1976). Zenith repeated those charges and also alleged violations of the Robinson-
Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976) and the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976). [1980-2] Trade
Cas. (CCH) 63,421, at 76,186-87 (3d Cir.).
A group of the defendants filed counterclaims charging Zenith with price-fixing, territorial
allocations, and price discrimination in violation of the Sherman Act §§ 1, 2, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2
(1976) and the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 13(a) (1976). They also charged Zenith
and a group of about thirty co-conspirators with maintaining a program of sham litigation against
competitors. Id at 76,187. Sears filed a separate counterclaim against Zenith for misleading ad-
vertising. Id
4. Id The "artificially" low prices were allegedly made possible by aid from the Japanese
government in maintaining high prices in Japan. Id at 76,186.
5. Mitsubishi Corp., Matsushita Electronic Industrials Co., Toshiba Corp., Sharp Corp.,
Sony Corp., Motorola, Inc., and eight defendant subsidiaries of those corporations moved to strike
the demand for a jury trial. Eight other defendants supported the motion, but did not join in it for
reasons unrelated to its merits. The positions of the remaining two defendants, Mitsubishi Electric
Corp. and its subsidiary Melco Sales, Inc., were unknown at the time of the trial. Id at 76,187.
1055
Washington University Open Scholarship
1056 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 58:1055
a jury trial, arguing that the case was too large and complex 6 for a jury
to comprehend. A divided Third Circuit,7 reversing the lower court,8
held: In cases too complex for a jury to understand and decide ration-
ally, the fifth amendment's due process clause9 overrides the seventh
amendment I and mandates a nonjury trial."
Because the seventh amendment preserves the right to trial by jury
only in suits at common law,"= as opposed to suits at equity,' 3 the exist-
ence of that jury right in a particular case depends on whether a suit is
6. To show complexity, the court outlined the case's size and subject matter. The district
court predicted that the trial would last a year. Discovery had lasted nine years and produced
millions of documents and over 100,000 pages of depositions. The conspiracy allegedly occurred
over thirty years and involved almost 100 firms. The defendants alleged that proof of the case
would involve detailed comparisons of American and Japanese marketing techniques, analysis of
complicated rebate schemes, and evaluation of sophisticated financial systems. The defendants
also alleged that it would require review of the technical features of thousands of different prod-
ucts and understanding of the relationships between those features and cost of manufacture, prod-
uct performance, and marketability. Id at 76,188-89. Finally, the defendants argued that the
complexity of the suit would be compounded by conceptually difficult issues, such as proof of
predatory intent. Id at 76,189.
The plaintiffs contended that massive, highly technical proof would not be required and that the
alleged conspiracy was a "classic" one; therefore, they did not anticipate problems injury compre-
hension. Id at 76,188.
The district court did not have to resolve the dispute as to degree of complexity because it found
that complexity was not relevant in ascertaining the right to a jury trial. Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889, 942 (E.D. Pa. 1979), rev'dsub nom, In re Japanese
Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation, [1980-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 63,421 (3d Cir.).
7. Judge Gibbons dissented. [1980-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,421, at 76,203 (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting).
8. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889 (E.D. Pa. 1979),
rev'd sub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation, [1980-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1
63,421 (3d Cir.).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. V states: "nor shall any person... be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law .. "
10. U.S. CONsT. amend. VII states:
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the
right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise
reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common
law.
11. [ 1980-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,421, at 76,198. The court remanded the case to the lower
court for a ruling on whether the case was actually too complex for a jury to understand. See note
6 supra.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. VII, supra note 10.
13. For discussions of the distinction between "law" and "equity," see Devlin, Jury Trial of
Complex Cases: English Practice at the Time of the Seventh Amendment, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 43,
48-65 (1980). See generally H. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQuITY 97-124
(2d ed. 1948).
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characterized as "legal" or "equitable."1 4 Traditionally, a court has
made that characterization by determining whether an English court, in
the year of the seventh amendment's adoption, 5 would characterize
the suit as "legal" or "equitable."' 6 Although the Supreme Court has
modified that strict historical test, not only to account for the creation
of new "legal" remedies,' 7 but also to allow jury trials of legal issues in
14. See Comment, The Right to an Incompetent Jury: Protracted Commercial Litigation and
the Seventh Amendment, 10 CONN. L. REv. 775, 788 (1978). See, e.g., Pernell v. Southall Realty,
416 U.S. 363, 371-81 (1974); Colgrove v. Battlin, 413 U.S. 149, 152 (1973); Ross v. Bernhard, 396
U.S. 531, 533 (1970); Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446-47 (1830).
15. See Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935) ("The right to
trial by jury thus preserved is the right which existed under English common law when the [sev-
enth] amendment was adopted." (1791)) Justice Story apparently made the first reference to Eng-
lish law in United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750):
Beyond all question, the common law alluded to [in the seventh amendment] is not the
common law of any individual state, (for it probably differs in all), but it is the common
law of England, the grand reservoir of all our jurisprudence. It cannot be necessary for
me to expound the grounds of this opinion, because they must be obvious to every per-
son acquainted with the history of the law.
See generally Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 M[NN. L. Rev.
639 (1973). In some cases the Court has apparently also referred to the common law of the Ameri-
can states as well as to that of England. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago R.I. &
P. Ry., 294 U.S. 648, 669 (1935). "That guaranty [the seventh amendment] has always been con-
strued to mean a trial in the mode and according to the settled rules of the common law, including
all the essential elements recognized in this country and England when the Constitution was
adopted." See also Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S.
540, 549 (1888).
16. See, e.g., Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 470 (1962); Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S.
1, 39 (1942); Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935); Dimick v.
Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935). Newly created causes of action are characterized generally as
"legal" or "equitable" by comparing the rights and remedies involved in them to traditional "le-
gal" and "equitable" remedies. See, e.g., Pernell v, Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 374-76 (1974)
(action to recover possession of real property); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193-97 (1974)
(action for violation of fair housing provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1968).
The Court has found that some specific practices of 1791 (the year of the seventh amendment's
adoption) remain part of the right to a jury trial. See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935)
(courts may not increase amount of a jury verdict). The Court also has ruled, however, that
certain changes in aspects of jury trials since 1791 are consistent with the amendment. See, e.g.,
Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 156-57 (1973) (twelve member jury not required by the seventh
amendment); Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 390 (1943) (directed verdict permitted);
Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494, 498-99 (1931) (new trial on less than
all the issues may be ordered); Walker v. New Mexico & S.P.R.RI, 165 U.S. 593, 596-98 (1897)
(judgment on the basis of answers to special interrogatories allowed when such answers conflict
with the general verdict).
17. Some causes of action involving traditionally equitable remedies may now be tried to
juries because of the creation of new legal remedies. In Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359
U.S. 500 (1959), the Court allowed a jury trial in a traditionally equitable suit, a stockholder's
derivative suit, because the new Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (1976), cre-
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predominately equitable cases, 8 the historical doctrine has not been
seriously questioned until recent years.19
In the 1970 decision, Ross v. Bernhard,2" however, the United States
Supreme Court included a footnote that has raised doubts about the
viability of the traditional method of distinguishing "legal" and "equi-
table" issues. The footnote stated that the "legal" nature of an issue is
determined by considering premerger custom, the remedy sought, and
"the practical abilities and limitations ofjuries."'2 Although premerger
custom and the nature of the remedy are arguably components of the
traditional historical test,22 the origin and meaning of the third factor is
unclear.23 The Supreme Court neither explained nor applied the test in
Ross 24 or any subsequent opinion discussing the seventh amendment. 25
ated an "adequate" remedy at law. The court explained that "[s]ince in the federal courts equity
has always acted only when the legal remedies were inadequate, the expansion of adequate legal
remedies. . . necessarily affects the scope of equity." Id at 509. See also Dairy Queen, Inc. v.
Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 478 n.19 (1962).
18. See, e.g., Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538-39 (1970); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369
U.S. 469, 470 (1962).
19. See, ag., Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 374-81 (1974); Curtis v. Loether, 415
U.S. 189, 193 (1974).
20. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
21. Id at 538 n.10.
22. See Note, The Right to a Jury Trial in Complex Civil Litigation, 92 HARM. L. REV. 898,
903 (1979); Note, Preserving the Right to Jury Trial in Complex Civil Cases, 32 STAN. L. REv. 99,
102 (1979).
23. See notes 30-41 infra and accompanying text. In addition to those theories, courts have
proposed other explanations for the meaning and origin of that third factor. The court in Radial
Lip Mach., Inc. v. International Carbide Corp., 76 F.R.D. 224 (N.D. IlL. 1977), argued that the
footnote permitted inquiry into jury competence:
[Tihe Court may have intended federal courts to make such an inquiry only at the
threshold stage where the issue is whether a right to a jury trial exists for the entire class
of claims asserted by the parties .... Once the Court had applied its three-pronged
analysis to characterize this class of claims as creating a right to a jury, .. individual
deviations in the complexity of the case would be irrelevant.
Id at 226.
In United States v. J.B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1974), Judge Friendly stressed that
the Ross footnote was part of an argument expanding the scope of the seventh amendment, not
contracting it, and argued that in any case it was only one of three factors to be weighed. Id at
428-29.
Some commentators consider the footnote an aberration. See, e.g., Redish, Seventh Amendment
Right to Jury Trial- A Study in the Irrationality of Rational Decision Making, 70 Nw. U.L. REv.
486, 526 (1975); Wolfrani, supra note 15, at 644-45. Others accept it as a constitutional test. See
Note, Preserving the Right to Jury Trial in Complex Civil Cases, 32 STAN. L. REv. 99, 105-06
(1979).
24. Once it decided that the corporation's claim for waste and breach of fiduciary duty was a
"legal" one, the Court summarily granted a jury trial. 396 U.S. at 542-43.
25. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupa-
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Some lower federal courts, however, have adopted the Ross footnote
as a new constitutional test for the right to a jury trial.26 Four lower
courts have used the footnote's third factor to deny the right to a jury
trial in an otherwise "legal" case.27 Each of those lower courts found
that the case before them was so complex28 that it was beyond the
"practical abilities and limitations of juries" and thus "equitable" un-
der Ross. 29 Two of the courts concluded that juror inability to compre-
hend intricate matters makes jury trials an inadequate remedy at law in
tional Safety & Health Rev. Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977); Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S.
363 (1974); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974); Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973). In
Loether the Seventh Circuit expressly considered the "practical abilities and limitations ofjuries"
before upholding the right to a jury trial. Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d 1110, 1118 (7th Cir. 1972),
ad sub noma. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1975). The Supreme Court, however, did not
mention jury ability as a factor.
26. See. e.g.. Pons v. Lorillard, 549 F.2d 950, 953 (4th Cir. 1977), aft'don other grounds, 434
U.S. 575 (1978); Minnis v. UAW, 531 F.2d 850. 852-53 (8th Cir. 1975); Fellows v. Medford Corp.,
431 F. Supp. 199, 201-02 (D. Or. 1977); Polstroffv. Fletcher, 430 F. Supp. 592, 593-94 (N.D. Ala.
1977); General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Watson-Bowman Assocs., 74 F.R.D. 139, 140-42 (D. Del.
1977); Marshall v. Electric Hose & Rubber Co., 413 F. Supp. 663, 667 (D. Del. 1976); Cayman
Music. Ltd. v. Reichenberger, 403 F. Supp. 794, 796-97 (W.D. Wis. 1975); Cleverly v. Western
Elec. Co., 69 F.R.D. 348, 350-52 (Vi.D. Mo. 1975); Rowan v. Howard Sober, Inc., 384 F. Supp.
1121, 1124-25 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Van Ermen v. Schmidt, 374 F. Supp. 1070, 1074-76 (W.D. Wis.
1974); Chilton v. National Cash Register Co., 370 F. Supp. 660, 662-66 (S.D. Ohio 1974); Richard
v Smoltich, 359 F. Supp. 9, 11-12 (N.D. Ili. 1973).
27. I.L.C. Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM, 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978), appealdock-
eted, Nos. 78-3050, 78-3236 (9th Cir. Sept. 12 & Oct. 6, 1978); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc.,
79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re United States Financial Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702 (S.D.
Cal. 1977), rev'd, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1866 (1980); In re Boise
Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976). Cf. Hyde Properties v. McCoy, 507
F.2d 301, 306 (6th Cir. 1974) (discussed jury incompetence but did not base decision on it); SEC v.
Associated Minerals, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 724, 725-26 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (discussed jury incompetence
but did not base decision on it).
28 LL. C Peripherals, Bernstein, United States Financial, and Boise all involved sophisticated
accounting procedures and financial systems. I.L.C. Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM, 458 F.
Supp. 423, 446 (N.D. Cal. 1978), appeal docketed, Nos. 78-3050, 78-3236 (9th Cir. Sept. 12 & Oct.
6, 1978); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59, 63, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re United
States Financial Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702, 706-07 (S.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd, 609 F.2d 411 (9th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1866 (1980); In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp.
99, 102-03 (W.D. Wash. 1976). In IL.C Peripherals the trial lasted five months and involved
2,300 exhibits and 87 witnesses. 458 F. Supp. at 444. In Bernstein the parties planned to introduce
1,200 exhibits and scores of witnesses. 79 F.R.D. at 63. The court in United States Financial
estimated that over 100,000 pages of documentary evidence would be introduced and at least 240
witnesses would be called. Approximately 150,000 pages of depositions had already been taken.
75 F.R.D. at 707. In Boise the jury would have had to evaluate management practices involving
over a billion dollars spent during a five year period. 420 F. Supp. at 103.
29. 458 F. Supp. at 445; 79 F.R.D. at 70; 75 F.R.D. at 710, 713-14; 420 F. Supp. at 104-05.
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complex cases.30  These courts found that complex cases are actually
equitable3' because inadequacy of legal remedies has been a traditional
justification for trying cases in equity.32 Other courts ruled that com-
plex cases historically were classified as "equitable" and now must be
considered "equitable. '33  One court asserted that cases "beyond jury
ability" were made equitable because of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments' command for fairness.34
None of these arguments, however, dissuaded two courts of appeals
in recent decisions from upholding the right to jury trials in complex
litigation.35  The courts in these cases concluded that complexity was
not a factor in determining the right to a jury trial.36 The courts ruled
that the Ross footnote did not establish a "complexity exception" to the
30. 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978); 75 F.R.D. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1977), rey'd, 609 F.2d 411
(9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1866 (1980). In United States Financial the court stated
that, "[t]he basis for granting equity jurisdiction over cases of extraordinary complexity is, of
course, the inadequacy of the legal remedy, or more specifically, the inability of the jury to handle
the case and render a fair decision, as the Court noted in Dairy Queen." 75 F.R.D. at 710.
The trial court in United States Financial quoted the following from Dairy Queen:
The necessary prerequisite to the right to maintain a suit for an equitable accounting
• ..is. . .the absence of an adequate remedy at law. Consequently, in order to main-
tain such a suit [in equity] on a cause of action cognizable at law, as this one is, the
plaintiff must be able to show that the "accounts between the parties" are of such a
"complicated nature" that only a court of equity can satisfactorily unravel them.
Id. (quoting 369 U.S. at 478). The court did not quote the next line of that section, which stated
that it would be a "rare case" in which the plaintiff could make the required showing. Id The
court also did not discuss the difference between actions "for an account," such as the action in
Dairy Queen, and other forms of action. See note 44 infra.
31. 458 F. Supp. at 447; 75 F.R.D. at 710.
32. See H. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 13, at 103. See also Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S.
469, 478 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 509 (1959); Kirby v. Lake Shore
& Mich. S.R.R., 120 U.S. 130 (1887); Fowle v. Lawrason, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 494 (1831); Clench v.
Tomley, 21 Eng. Rep. 13 (Ch. 1603). But see Curriden v. Middleton, 232 U.S. 633 (1914) (compli-
cation of fact and difficulty of proof alone are not sufficient to confer equity jurisdiction); United
States v. Bitter Root Dev. Co., 200 U.S. 451 (1906) (same). See also note 44 infra and accompany-
ing text.
33. 79 F.R.D. at 67; 75 F.R.D. at 708.
34. The court in Boise said:
[T]he procedural safeguards inherent in our legal system provide the impression and fact
of fairness. ... Indeed, under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the legitimacy of
government action is measured in terms of fairness. Central to the fairness which must
attend the resolution of a civil action is an impartial and capable fact finder.
420 F. Supp. at 104. The Ross footnote was the only precedent cited for the above statements, Id
35. In re United States Financial Sec. Antitrust Litigation, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cerl.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 1866 (1980); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Inlus. Co., 478 F. Supp.
889 (E.D. Pa. 1979), rev'dsub nonm In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation, [1980-21 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 63,421 (3d Cir.).
36. 609 F.2d at 432; 478 F. Supp. at 942.
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seventh amendment. One court found that the footnote was too iso-
lated and unexplained to be a new constitutional test.3 7 These courts
also concluded that other rationales given for denying jury trials were
unpersuasive. 3" Because the courts adjudged that jury trials were at
least as fair as bench trials, they ruled that jury trials in complex litiga-
tion were not inadequate remedies at law.39 One court also expressly
rejected the argument that complex cases were "historically" equita-
ble4" after examining precedent and finding that only a single case ac-
tually supported that assertion.4
In Japanese Electronic Products the Third Circuit agreed that most
arguments previously given for denying jury trials in complex cases
were insufficient. The court stated that although Ross left open the
possibility that jury ability could be considered,42 the footnote was too
unsubstantiated to be a new constitutional test.43 The Japanese Elec-
tronic Products court also rejected the argument that complex cases
were "historically" equitable after finding insufficient support for that
proposition.' The court, following traditional doctrine, found that the
action in question was "legal," and recognized the existence of the right
to a jury trial.45
37. 609 F.2d at 425-26; 478 F. Supp. at 931-34.
38. See 609 F.2d at 427-31; 478 F. Supp. at 934-38. See also notes 30-34 supra and accompa-
nying text.
39. 609 F.2d at 427-31; 478 F. Supp. at 934-38.
40. 478 F. Supp. at 915-18.
41. Id
42. The court stated that, "at the very least, the Court has left open the possibility that the
'practical abilities and limitations of juries' may limit the range of suits subject to the seventh
amendment and has read its prior seventh amendment decisions as not precluding such a ruling."
[1980-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 63,421, at 76,193.
43. The court found that it was "unlikely that the Supreme Court would have announced an
important new application of the seventh amendment in so cursory a fashion." Id
44. The court noted that in some of the cases cited to show conferral of equity jurisdiction
based on complexity, clear grounds for equity existed apart from complexity. Id at 76,194. See
Wedderburn v. Pickering, 13 Ch. D. 769 (M.R. 1879); Clarke v. Cookson, 2 Ch. D. 746, 747-48
(V.C. 1876). Other cases cited involved a specialized form of action, actions for accounts, in which
complexity has traditionally played a role in determining equity jurisdiction. The court, however,
observed that suits for money damages in trespass or tort, such as antitrust cases, are not analo-
gous to actions in accounts. [1980-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 63,421, at 76,194. See Kirby v. Lake
Shore & Mich. S.R.R., 120 U.S. 130 (1887); Fowle v. Lawrason, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 494 (1831). Ulti-
mately, the court found only one case, Clench v. Tomley, 21 Eng. Rep. 13 (Ch. 1603), to support
the historical equity jurisdiction argument; the court deemed that case, however, to be of such
dubious reliability that it had little precedential value. [1980-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) T 63,421, at
76,195-96.
45. The court determined that the suit in question was "plainly legal in nature" because it
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The court's analysis, however, did not end with that conclusion. Af-
ter disposing of the contention that a statutory right to a jury trial ex-
isted in this case,4 6 the court delineated its own argument for denying
the right to a jury trial in complex litigation. First the court asserted
that trials by juries, which lack the experience" 7 and legal tools4" avail-
able to judges, create such a high risk of erroneous decisions in extraor-
dinarily complex cases4 9 that due process rights are violated. 0 A
sought relief "traditionally associated with courts of law: compensatory and punitive damages"
and because prior cases "have always assumed that the seventh amendment guarantees a jury trial
in antitrust suits." [1980-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 63,421, at 76,192. See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v.
Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 504 (1959); Columbia Metal Culvert Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem.
Corp., 579 F.2d 20, 23 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978).
46. [1980-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 9163,421, at 76,189-92. The court found that comments in the
legislative history showing that jury trials were expected were based on the assumed applicability
of the seventh amendment, and therefore did not indicate an intent to create a statutory jury
guarantee. The court also found that a statement in Fleitmann v. Welsbach St. Lighting Co., 240
U.S. 27, 29 (1916), that treble damage statutes provide the remedy of "the verdict ofjury in a court
of common law" and "provide[s] no other [remedy]" did not create a statutory jury right in treble
damage actions. The court agreed that under Fleitman treble damage suits must either be brought
"at law," or dismissed, but concluded that FHeitman did not consider the status of cases brought
"at law," but without the right to a jury. [1980-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 63,421, at 76,190-91.
47. [1980-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 63,421, at 76,199. The court stated:
Although we cannot presume that a judge will be more intelligent than a jury or more
familiar with technical subject matters, a judge will almost surely have substantial famil-
iarity with the process of civil litigation, as a result of experience on the bench or in
practice. This experience can enable him to digest a large amount of evidence and legal
argumentation, segregate distinct issues and portions of evidence relevant to each issue,
assess the opinions of expert witnesses, and apply highly complex legal standards to the
facts of the case.
1d
The court also noted that judges have an advantage in trying long and complex cases because
such cases do not interrupt their careers and activities, as they do for jurors. Id
48. The examples given by the court were colloquies with expert witnesses and the option of
reopening trial for clarification or additional evidence. Id
49. The court defined an "extraordinarily complex" case as one so complex that it "renders
the suit beyond the ability of a jury to decide by rational means with a reasonable understanding
of the evidence and applicable legal rules." Id at 76,200. Although the court stated that most
judges would have "sufficient familiarity" with jury ability to know if a case is too complex for a
jury, the court did delineate guidelines involving three factors for judging complexity:
first, the overall size of the suit, the primary indicia of which are the estimated length of
trial, the amount of evidence to be introduced and the number of issues that will require
individual consideration; second, the conceptual difficulties. . . which are likely to be
reflected in the amount of expert testimony to be submitted and the probable length and
detail of jury instructions, and third the difficulty of segregating distinct aspects of the
case. ...
1d
The sole dissenter, Judge Gibbons, asserted that these guidelines still allowed too much judicial
discretion. Judge Gibbons advocated disjoinder of claims and separate jury trials if a case is too
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conflict then exists between the right to a jury trial under the seventh
amendment and the right to due process under the fifth amendment.5'
When such a conflict arises, the court must balance the respective con-
stitutional rights.5 2 Due process outweighs the right to a jury trial be-
cause due process is essential to "basic justice,"53 while juries, as shown
by their absence in courts of equity, are not essential to the administra-
tion of justice. 4 The court concluded, therefore, that due process re-
quires a nonjury trial in extremely complex cases.
The Japanese Electronic Products court stated that the essential prob-
lem in jury trials in complex cases is that juries may be incapable of
correctly understanding massive amounts of complicated information,
and thus may be unable to reach a rational, fair decision.56 Courts that
sidestep the fairness issue by relabelling suits as "equitable" focus at-
tention away from the real issues.57 A court's determination that jury
trials are "inadequate remedies"58 identifies the problem, but does not
confront the real due process issue59 because the cause of the "inade-
quacy" is the danger of an erroneous or irrational decision.6"
complex for a jury, rather than eliminating the right to a jury. Id. at 76,203 (Gibbons, J., dissent-
ing).
50. Id at 76,196-201. After conceding that no specific precedent existed for finding a due
process violation in the trial of a case to a jury, the court nevertheless found that the "principles"
defining due process limited the range of cases that can be submitted to a jury. The court noted
that one of the primary values of due process is to "minimize the risk of erroneous decisions.' Id
(citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979)
and Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). It then reasoned that where a jury "cannot
understand the evidence and the legal rules to be aplied," there is "no reliable safeguard against
erroneous decisions." Id at 76,197.
51. Id
52. Id. For other examples of "balancing" to resolve conflicts between constitutional rights,
see Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 392-93 (1979) (right to freedom of speech v. right to
a fair trial); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976) (same).
53. The court rejected arguments that due process carried less weight in this case because the
violation was "hypothetical" and "prospective." The court stressed that due process requirements
by their nature are "prospective" because they are "safeguards against the possibility of erroneous
and arbitrary deprivations of liberty and property." But, the court concluded, they are no less
important because of that characteristic. 11980-21 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,421, at 76,197-98.
54. Id
55. Id
56. Id at 76,196-201.
57. See notes 30-34 supra and accompanying text.
58. See notes 30-33 supra and accompanying text.
59. See notes 47-50 supra and accompanying text. See also Arnold, A Historical Inquiry into
the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex Civil Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. Rv. 829, 830 n.4 (1980).
60. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
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Future litigation in the area of the availability of juries in complex
trials will probably center on the due process issue. The Third Circuit's
conclusions that jury trials in complex litigation increase the risk of
erroneous decisions6 and that this constitutes a violation of due proc-
ess,62 will be crucial points of contention because this reasoning is not
universally accepted.63 The court convincingly demonstrates that a
jury is less qualified than a judge to unravel the facts in massive, com-
plicated cases. A jury does not have a judge's experience in segregating
distinct issues, his understanding of legal terms and processes, or his
power to guide the trial.' Thus, jury trials involve greater risks of er-
roneous decisions than do bench trials because of the greater risk of
misinformed triers of fact.65 Because a crucial function of due process
in factfinding procedures is "to minimize the risk of erroneous deci-
sions,"66 the court is correct in asserting that jury trials in extraordina-
rily complex litigation constitute a violation of due process.67
Once that due process violation is identified, a clear conflict exists
between two constitutional rights. Both reason and precedent 68 dictate
that a court must balance the conflicting rights to determine which is
more essential. Because due process is required in all trials, while ju-
ries are required only in some, 69 due process is more fundamental.
Furthermore, jury trials in complex cases may hinder a court's ability
to render "basic justice. ' 70  Certainly, both the fifth and seventh
amendments guarantee important rights; but if a conflict exists, the
right to a fair trial outweighs the right to a jury trial.
The Third Circuit has clarified the issues involved in jury trials of
61. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
62. [1980-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) t 63,421, at 76,200.
63. See In re United States Financial Secs. Antitrust Litigation, 609 F.2d 411, 430 (9th Cir.
1979) cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1866 (1980); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478
F. Supp. 889, 934-36 (E.D. Pa. 1979), rev'dsub nom In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litiga-
tion, [1980-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 63, 421 (3d Cir.). See also Higginbotham, Continuing the Dia.
logue: Civil Juries and the Ai11ocation ofJudicial Power, 56 TEx. L. REv. 47, 54 (1977) (trial to a
jury forces lawyers to present evidence more clearly); Kalven, The Dignity a/the CiriiJury, 50 VA.
L. Rev. 1055, 1064 (1964) (survey of 600 judges shows that judges and juries agree in 79% of civil
cases and that disagreement does not increase in cases rated as "difficult").
64. See note 49 supra.
65. [1980-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,421, at 76,198-200.
66. Id at 76,197. See notes 47-50, 60 supra and accompanying text.
67. [1980-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,421, at 76,198.
68. See note 50 supra.
69. [1980-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,421, at 76,197.
70. Id
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complex litigation and proposed a reasonable method for resolving
those issues. The Supreme Court should settle the controversy sur-
rounding the availability of jury trials in complex litigation by examin-
ing and endorsing the Third Circuit's rationale and result.
ANTITRUST LAW-LIABILITY OF PROFESSIONS-PHYSICIANS'
AGREEMENTS TO SET MAXIMUM FEES IN FOUNDATIONS FOR MEDICAL
CARE ARE NOT PER SE VIOLATIONS OF THE SHERMAN ACT. Arizona v.
Maricopa County Medical Society, [1980-11 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,239
(9th Cir.). The State of Arizona brought an antitrust action in federal
district court against two foundations for medical care (FMCs)' and a
county medical society, alleging that the groups established fixed medi-
cal fees in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.' Arizona sought
to enjoin the FMC physicians from setting maximum prices for their
medical services. On a motion for summary judgment, the state argued
that price-fixing agreements among competitors are per se3 illegal. The
district court, denying the motion,4 ruled that the agreements were not
price-fixing per se, and that rule of reason5 analysis should determine
the legality of the agreement. On appeal6 the court affirmed, and held:
Agreements among FMC physicians setting maximum prices for fees
are not per se price-fixing arrangements, and a rule of reason-analysis
1. FMCs are associations of physicians in traditional private practices. The associations are
sponsored by county medical societies. FMCs have two basic purposes: (I) To provide prepaid
health services to consumers, and (2) to control health care costs and improve the quality of medi-
cal services through peer review. FMCs approve and administer insurance plans underwritten by
private insurance companies. Physicians directly bill the third-party insurer for the individual
medical services provided to patient-policyholders.
One way that FMC physicians control costs is by collectively agreeing to set maximum prices
that they will charge to FMC insurance plans for services. Price ceilings are periodically set by
majority vote. FMCs also cut medical costs through review systems that weed out unnecessary
medical procedures and hospital visits. See generally C. STEINWALD, AN INTtRODUCrION TO
FOUNDATIONS FOR MEDICAL CAtE (1971); Egdahl, Foundationsfor Medical Care, 288 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 491 (1973).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) in pertinent part provides: "Every contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal .... "
3. See notes 13-15 infra and accompanying text.
4. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soe'y, [1979-11 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,694 (D.
Ariz.), interlocutory appeal ajt'd, [1980-11 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 63,239 (9th Cir.).
5. See notes 10-12 infra and accompanying text.
6. Appeal was brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976).
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